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I. INTRODUCTION

The patent system exists as a quid pro quo between an inventor and the
government.' The inventor provides a disclosure of how to make and use an
invention; in exchange, the government provides a limited period during which
the inventor can prevent others from making, using, or selling that invention
within that government's jurisdiction. 2 This exclusive right is valuable, enabling
an inventor to sell a patented product at a monopoly price that is much higher
than the competitive market's equilibrium price, which would exist in the
absence of a patent

3

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) writes reports advocating that
economics should guide patent policy. In one such report, the FTC argues that
society only benefits from the patent system when inventions that offer a
substantial advance to the state of the art are awarded patents. 4 Furthermore,
when inventions that provide a lesser benefit to society receive patents,
innovation is actually harmed.5 The FTC recommends that inventions be
6
rigorously screened for patentability.
This Article examines the issue of questionable patents cited by the FTC and
looks at the problem of patents that are obvious in view of preexisting material.
This Article then analyzes how unexpected results can be effective for proving
patentability and concludes with a proposal for a rigid application of
unexpected results to better discern which advances are beneficial to society and
which are not In particular, Part II of this paper explains the economic
underpinnings of the Patent System. Part III discusses the legal underpinnings
of the Patent System. Part IV describes the patent requirement of nonobviousness. Part V further elaborates on how declarations on an invention's
unexpected experimental results can be used to overcome rejections for nonobviousness.
Part VI proposes using signal theory to determine nonobviousness of intentions when a declaration is submitted and provides a
framework for doing so. Part VII concludes the Article with a way forward in
this regard.

1 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, at Exec. Summary 2 (2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O03/1O/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM'N,
To PROMOTE INNOVATION].

2 Bronwyn H. Hall, Patents and PatentPofig, 23 OxFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 568 (2007).
3 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1.

4 Id. at ch. 4, at 3.
5 Id
6 Id at ch. 6, at 18-20.
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II. ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM

The literature in economics of patent systems has been robustly debated
since the Patent Act of 1952 was first proposed.7 On one hand, patents provide
an incentive to inventors to disclose their inventions to society by offering the
sovereign's enforcement of exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the product
within the sovereign's borders.8 On the other hand, patents can create market
exclusivity, causing fewer products to sell at higher prices than would otherwise
sell under perfect competition. 9 The debate over the past few generations has
resulted in few concrete conclusions. 10
From a ricroeconomic perspective, most patents have no microeconomic
value." This is especially true when the underlying technology is never
produced, sold, or licensed 12 Ninety-five percent of patents fall into this
3
category, representing ventures that simply never materialized for inventors.
Among the group of patents that do get produced, many claim only one of
several approaches to a particular end goal.' 4 Of these patents, enforcement
does not result in monopolies because these patents cannot lead to exclusivity
in a defined marketplace.' 5 In re Lowry is an exemplary case regarding such
patents. 16 In this successful appeal, Lowry patented the primary key as a way of
indexing data by using a rather small amount of memory connected to a

7 John L. King, An Empirical Investigation of the Economics of Patent Institutions, at 6-10
(Oct. 20, 2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University) (on file with author)
(providing an overview of economists' theoretical contributions to the patent system).
8 FFD. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, at ch. 6, at 1-2 (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTn RUST GUIDEILNES FOR THtE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.0 (Apr. 6, 1995)).
9 FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, at ch. 1, at 3 (quoting 1
HTERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANITrRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTIRUST PRINCIPLES
APPLIED TO INTELECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 1.2 at 1-5 through 1-6 (2002)).

10 Bronwyn H. Hall, The Use and Value of PatentRights, at 3 (June 10, 2009) (research paper, UK
IP Ministerial Forum on the Economic Value of Intellectual Property), available at http://www.
uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia-implementation/ipp-201 Inov08-ukipo-2.pdf.
11 CRISTIAN GRUBE, MEASURING THE IMMEASURABLE: VALUING PATENT PROTECTION OF
KNOWLEDGE-BASED COMPETDnIE ADVANTAGES 154 (Gabler, 2009).

12 Id. But see Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Iam Ziedonis, The Patent ParadoxRevisited: An
EmpiticalStudy of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industy, 1979-1995, 32 RANDJ. ECON. 101, 125
(2001) (finding microcconomic value in the valuation of firms with strong defensive patent
portfolios).
13 GRUBE, supra note 11, at 154; See also Erich Kaufer, The Economics of the PatentSystem, in 30
ECONOMICS OF'TECHNICAL C IANGEI 79, 80 (F.M. Scherer ed., 1989).
14 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE. INNOVATION, supra note 1, at 9.

Id.
16 In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
15
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microprocessor.17 Since the data could be indexed in any way, there was no
marketplace exclusivity for data indexing, and thus no monopoly. 18 Contrast
Lowy with R'tz Camera & Image, LLC v. Sandisk Corporation, where Sandisk
controlled roughly 75% of the market for flash memory, thereby giving it the
ability to exercise monopoly power. 19
Economists have spent little time analyzing situations discussed in Erich
Kaufer's "The Economics of the Patent System" or In re Lowgy, where the
patent simply failed to result in market exclusivity. Rather, the economic
research that has received substantial attention over the past twenty years has
been patent stacking.20 Patent stacking occurs where a single person, or cartel,
obtains a large number of Lowy-style patents and effectively takes over all
21
varieties of indexing data.
The problem of patent stacking can initially be analyzed by having a first
mover in a market for the sale of goods. 22 In this market, the seller determines
quantity based on where the seller's marginal revenue is equal to their marginal
cost.23 The seller will then raise their price to the demand curve, resulting in a
24
consumer surplus.
Being the initial entrant within the relevant market, a first mover acquires a
monopoly status; with that, an entrant naturally has market dominance and can
charge a monopolistic price.25 Economists have noted that this situation is not
necessarily a negative, and that a consumer surplus that exists as a result of a
monopoly is better than no consumer surplus at al2 6
The problem with this model is that modem innovation rarely involves a
single good in a single market. 27 More frequently, there is a consumer that
desires many separately patented technologies to make a single device.28 This
problem is not new; in fact, Antoine Augustin Cournot, a notable French

17 Id.at

1580-82.
1583-94.
19Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. Sandisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 505 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
20Hall, supra note 10, at 4; Kaufer, supra note 13, at 79-80.
18 Id.at

21 Wiliam Cook, FRAND orFoe, MANAGING IP (June 1, 2006), http://www.managingip.com/
Article/1254371 /FRAND-or- foe.html.
22 Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-BenefitApproach to PatentObziousness, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 39, 61-63

(2008).
23Id.at 63.
24 Id at 62.
25 Cook, supranote 21.
26 Chiang, supra note 22, at 62.
27 Hall, supra note 2,
at 573.
28 Id.
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economist and mathematician, 29 analyzed this precise situation in 1838.30
Cournot suggested a hypothetical involving a brass manufacturer who required
copper and zinc, each of these materials being controlled by different
monopolists. 31 The French economist explained that the resulting price of
brass was higher when a division of monopolies controlled the necessary
articles, than if a single monopolist controlled the copper and zinc.32 These
independent monopolies resulted in higher prices for consumers, less revenue
for each of the material producers, and the end producer subsequently
33
obtaining most of the available surplus.
Beginning with this framework, Economist Carl Shapiro expanded on
Cournot, and stated that the industrial organization of patent rights holders
would be to form cartels, eliminating the inefficiency of multiple blocking
34
patents, and thus demand single monopolist prices from the end producer.
Shapiro argued that "patent pools" would form among holders of
complementary patents, with those holders using their rights either to extract
greater royalties from end producers, or simply to making the goods
themselves. 35 Patent pools are a collection of distinct patents held by separate
entities that are pooled for purposes of joint licensing. 36 This model argues that
social welfare will increase when goods are perfect complements, and that social
37
welfare will decrease when goods are perfect substitutes.
Shapiro's expanded economic theory explains firm behavior for creating
patent pools, but it fails to consider the aggregate effect of the patent system on
the macroeconomy. The patent system's effect on the macroeconomy is usually
measured in terms of capital accumulation and correlating that to stock of
patents.38

Economic growth can be measured as a time derivative of real gross
domestic product (GDP) per worker. 39 Real GDP is a measure of the value of
29 See general

James W. Friedman, The Legay ofAugustin Cournot (Univ. of NC. at Chapel Hill,

Dep't of Econ. Working Paper No. 99-05, 1999), available at http://www.unc.edu/depts/econ/
papers/99-05.pdf (reviewing Cournot's contributions to economic theory).
30 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and StandardSetting, in 1
INNOVATION POLICY ANDTiE i ECONOMY 119,123 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2000).
31 AUGUSTIN COuRNOT, REsLARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OFT THE THEORY
OF WEALTH 99-104 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Macmillan Co. ed., 1897) (1838).
32 Id. at 104.
33 Shapiro, supra note 30, at 123.
34Id
35 Id
36 Id. at 127.
37 Id. at 124.
38 Tatsuro lwaisako & Koichi Futagami, Patent Protection, Capital Accumulation, and Economic
Growth, 52 ECON. THEORY 631, 642 (2013).
39 ROBERT BARROW, MACROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 116 (2007).
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economic output adjusted for inflation. 40 When divided by population, this
measure per worker gives an assessment of average human capital. 41 Human
capital is an amalgamation of a worker's knowledge, skills, and abilities, which
enable that worker to perform labor that creates economic value. 42 Human
capital's existence is proven; whether it is properly utilized is up for debate.
Human capital is a function of the economy's use of labor divided by the
economy's use of capital. 43 As a result, more investment in human capital leads
44
to more growth and a more efficient use of labor in the economy as a whole.
4
Economists refer to this conclusion as the "endogenous growth model.
Tatsuro Iwaisako & Koichi Futagami, studied the effects of strengthening
patent protection, in one instance, by increasing the patent term length.46 They
proffered that lengthening the patent term would increase innovation, but
would decrease capital accumulation. 47 If the effect of the former were to
outweigh that of the latter, then the policy was deemed sound. If a decrease in
capital accumulation outweighed a resulting increase in innovation, the policy
should be altered. 48 They concluded "strengthening patent protection reduces
the growth rate of output, if the productivity of R&D relative to the production
of physical capital is sufficiently low." 49 Returning to the microeconomic
framework, a firm has a decision as to whether it should buy existing equipment
or innovate new equipment.50 The firm should do whatever is most profitable
and the sovereign should create policies that encourage likewise behavior."s
An extension of Iwaisako and Futagami would be that if patent protection
were weakened the results would include a lower cost of patenting, greater
access to novel ideas for the benefit of progress, and a more level-playing field
between large and small companies in the same fields. 52 Michele Boldrin &
David K. Levine note that there is no evidence for increased innovation and

40
41

Id.
Id

42 DAVID

B. AUDRETSCH,

EVERYTHING

IN

ITS

PLACE:

ENTREPRENEURSHIP

AND

THE

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF ClmJs, REGIONS, AND STATES 45 (2015).
43

Id.

44Id.

45 Knut Blind & Andre Jungmittag, The Impact of Patentsand Standardson Macroeconomic Growth: A
Pane/Approach Covering FourCountries and 12 Sectors, 29 J. PROD. ANAL 51, 52 (2008).
46 Iwaisako & Futagami, supra note 38, at 631.
47 Id at 649.
48 Id at 650.
49 Id
50 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION,

51Id Exec. Summary, at 3.
52 Iwaisako & Futagami, supra note 38, at 634.
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productivity as a result of patents.5 3 While Tun-Jen Chiang may agree with
Levine and Boldrin's observation, he does note that there is still an overall
social benefit due to producer surplus dissipation. 54 Additionally, Hubbard
mentioned that with a more efficient patenting process, this can allow for
55
competitive economic rivalry, which then leads to economic growth.
Jos6 M. Ortiz-Villajos studied the results of the relationship between
technology and economic development at the level of sovereigns in twenty
countries between 1800 and 2000.56 Historically, he found a strong relationship
between the total number of patents issued and per capita income, along with a
strong relationship between the number of patents issued and capital
accumulation. 57 He observed that at the same time, society moved resources
from consumer spending to capital investment.5 8 This conclusion would seem
to contrast the endogenous growth model as though society is investing in
R&D spending over individual to obtain exclusive protection from patents.
That is not to say, however, that individuals did not benefit. 59 One study of
business method patents in Australia found that the number of patents issued
per capita was generally correlated with economic well-being; and that business
method patents in particular had little effect on this result. 60 Additional
research studied the impact of patents on macroeconomic growth and
concluded that both patents and technical standards contributed to economic
growth. 61 In 2013, Hubbard proposed restructuring the patent process so that
patents could allow for economic competitive advantage, which could lead to
economic growth. 62 Moreover, Shapiro and Hassett noted that patents could
increase global investments and overall global economic growth. 63 They found
that for every 1% increase in the degree of patent protection in a developing

53 Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents 15 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012035.pdf.
54 Chiang, supra note 22, at 60-61.
55 William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents, 54 B.C. L. REv. 1909, 1942
(2013).
16 Jos6 M. Ortiz-Villajos, Patents and Economic Growth in the Long Term: A Quantitative Approach,
52 BRussELs ECON. REV. 305 (2009).
57 Id. at 333-34.
58 Id at 335.
59 Hazel V.J. Moir, Do Patent Systems Improve Economic Well-Being? An Exploration of the
Inventiveness of Business Method Patents 9 (Sept. 15, 2008) (Ph.D. thesis, Australian National
University), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1423248.
60 Id at 9, 74.
61 Id. at 11.

Hubbard, supra note 55, at 1913.
Robert J. Shapiro & Kevin A. Hassett, The Economic Value of Intellectual Propery 11 (2005),
http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/ntellectualPropertyReport-October2005.pdf.
62

63
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country, the United States invests 0.45% into that country, which promotes
international economic relations and an overall social benefit.64
III. LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
The preceding historical studies considered whether a series of events had a
positive or negative impact on society. However, they offer little insight into
contemporary policy changes. Mark Lemley and others explain that, at the time
of filing a patent application, it is unclear which patents will provide positive
benefits to society and which patents will be a drain on social resources. 65 To
clarify, the positive benefits to society occur if the advance in technology
66
disclosed in the patent were to spur further innovation in the United States.
Alternatively, the patent would be considered an economic drain if it merely
caused an increase in prices or prevented others from working in the field of
67
innovation.
The FIC has defined questionable patents as those that are "likely invalid or
contain claims that are likely overly broad," causing the economic drain cited by
Lemley. 68 A patent is likely invalid if it exclusively contains features that existed
prior to the date on which the application is filed. 69 A patent's claims are likely
overly broad if they claim a combination of new and existing technology such
that the development lacks significant technological advancement.70 One
purpose of patent prosecution is to have the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) filter patent applications for inventions that are likely invalid, or
overly broad]'1 Patent claims to inventions that are likely invalid or overly
broad can be characterized as "obvious" in view of either a single prior art
72
reference or a combination of prior art references.
Rejecting patent application claims in view of a combination of prior art
references was traditionally challenging for the USPTO.7 3 In a 2003 report, the
64

Id at 9.

65 Mark Lemley et al., What to DoAbout BadPatents?,28 REG. 10, 12 (Winter 2005).
66 Hubbard, supra note 55, at 1928-29.
67 Id. at 1929-30; FED. T1RADE COMMCN, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1,

Exec.

Summary, at 5.
68 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, ch. 1, at 5; Lemley et al.,
supra note 65, at 12.
69 35 U.S.C.S. § 102 (2012); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1,
ch. 1, at 10 n.65.
70 35 U.S.C.S. § 103 (2012); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1,
Exec. Summary, at 10.
71 35 U.S.C.S. § 2 (2012); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, spra note 1,
Exec. Summary, at 14.
72 35 U.S.C.S. § 103.
73 FED. TRADE COMMN, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, ch. 6, at 10-12.
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FTC expressed concern that the USPTO required proof of a "suggestion" to
combine prior art references in order to demonstrate obviousness of an
invention. 74 Before Congress could respond, the United States Supreme Court,
in KSR Intl Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., held that if a combination was obvious to try,
75
then the combination was not patentable, largely resolving the FTC's concern.
While the KSR decision did some work to alleviate the problem of questionable
patents, granting obvious patents remains a problem.
IV. AN EXPLANATION OF OBVIOUSNESS

To put KSR and the problem of obviousness into context, a brief overview
of the patent prosecution system is useful. At a high level, a patent is a contract
between the public and an inventor, where the public receives knowledge of
how to make and use an invention and, in exchange, the inventor is granted the
exclusive right to make, use, sell, or offer to sell the invention within the United
States.7 6 To obtain a patent, an inventor submits an application, along with a
77
fee, to the USPTO to have the application reviewed by a patent examiner. If
the patent examiner finds that the application meets certain requirements, then
the examiner will officially grant the patent.7 8 Alternatively, if the examiner
does not believe that the invention is patentable, then the examiner issues an
office action rejecting the claims and giving the applicant time to respond. 79 A
study of issue-specific patent appeal statistics revealed that the most common
basis for a rejection is finding the claims obvious in view of some prior art
80
reference or combination.
If the patent examiner rejects the application twice, the applicant can appeal
to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), then the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, and finally to the U.S. Supreme Court. 81 In practice, few
patent applications make it this far on appeal. Typically, most cases are
resolved by an agreement as to patentability between the examiner and the

74 Id.

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
Hall, supra note 2, at 568; Davis Airfoils, Inc. v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 514, 124 F. Supp.
350 (1954) ("A patent is a contract between the inventor and the public, the terms of which are
formulated by the United States Patent Office.").
75
76

- 35 U.S.C.S.
MPEP

§ 111 (2012).

§ 1302

(9th ed. Rev. Mar. 2014).
79 Id. § 706.
80 Kate S. Gaudry & Joseph J. Mallon, Appeals and RCEs - The Frequeny and Success of Challenges
to Specific Rejection Types, INTE.I1 .PROP. TODAY, Nov. 2011, at 24, 24.
78

81 35 U.S.C.S. % 134, 141 (2012).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2016

9

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

J. I\TELL PROP.L

[Vol. 23:241

applicant. 82 This agreement involves the patent examiner ultimately awarding a
patent for any new, useful, and non-obvious advance in technology. 83 When an
agreement cannot be reached between the examiner and the applicant, the most
common issue on appeal to the PTAB is obviousness. 84
The Patent Act explains that no patent shall be awarded "if the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious ... to a person having ordinary
skill in the art" at the time the application was filed. 85 Obviousness is a legal
conclusion based on underlying facts. 86 The underlying factual inquiries in
evaluating the obviousness of claims include: (i) the scope and content of the
prior art; (ii) the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; (iii)
the level of ordinary skill in the field of the invention; and (iv) relevant
secondary considerations including commercial success, long felt but unsolved
87
needs, failure of others, and unexpected results.
When issuing a rejection based on section 103,88 the patent examiner must
demonstrate a primafacie case of obviousness by showing that the skill level of
one of ordinary skill in the art could bridge the differences between the prior art
and the claimed invention. 89 The burden then shifts to the applicant to rebut
this conclusion or argue that the secondary considerations outweigh the
examiner's finding of obviousness. 90 At a high level, the legal conclusion of
obviousness represents society's effort to balance the concerns expressed by the
FTC, where only inventions that offer a substantial improvement to the state of
the art should be granted a monopoly.91 At a low level, the requirements
establish objective criteria for evaluation by courts and the PTAB.92 From
either perspective, the function of unexpected results to support the finding of
an invention ac non- obvious is to filter out non meritorious patents.9"

82 USPTO, PATENT TRiAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS (July 31, 2015), http://www.uspto.
gov/ sites/ default/ files/ documents/ 2015-07-31%20P'AB.PDF.
83 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141,150 (1989).
84 Gaudry & Mallon, sup ra note 80.
85 35 U.S.C. 5 103 (2012).
86 In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
87 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
88 35 U.S.C.S. 5 103 (2012).

89 MPEP § 2142
90 Id.
91 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, ch. 4, at 2-3.

92 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
93 FFD. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, ch. 4, at 15.
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V. OVERCOMING OBVIOUSNESS BY DEMONSTRATING UNEXPECTED
RESULTS

An inventor can overcome a prima fade finding of obviousness by
establishing unexpected results in an experiment and detailing these results in
their submission of a declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132, commonly referred
to as a "Rule 132 declaration." 94 Unexpected results require (i) a hypothesis of
how the claimed invention would perform; 95 (ii) an experiment under controlled
scientific conditions that tests the hypothesis; 96 (iii) a prior art device, similarly
tested in the experiment; 97 (iv) results showing that the claimed invention
exceeds both the hypothesis and the prior art; 98 and (v) results that are
"different in kind and not merely in degree of the prior art."99
Arguing "unexpected results" in the face of an obviousness rejection has
both a subjective and an objective component. 1' ° The subjective component
requires that the unexpected results exceed expectations; therefore, a predicted
or expected outcome needs to be established as a baseline.10'
Once this.
expected result is established, one can subjectively discern if the actual result is
unexpected. 1 2 The objective component involves comparing the claimed
invention to the closest prior art. 10 3 Results are unexpected if the experiment
shows that the applicant surpassed both the hypothesis and the closest prior art
in the same test. 1 4
Turning first to the subjective component, expected beneficial results are
inherent in the inventive process and do not confer patentable subject matter
onto a claim. 1 05 Accordingly, the person completing the testing is required to
include a statement that "the results were unexpected" within the declaration,

- 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 (2015); MPEP § 716.
95 In re Klosak, 455 F.2d 1077, 1080 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
9 In re Baxter Travenol Labs, 952 F.2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
- MPEP §716.02(b)(III).
98 In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 748-49 (Fed. Cit.
1995).
99 In reAller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
100Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 16 (1966).
101 In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
102 See MPEP § 716.02(a)(I) (instructing, "a greater than additive effect is not necessarily
sufficient to overcome a prima fade case of obviousness because such an effect can either be
expected or unexpected. Applicants must further show that the results were greater than those
which would have been expected from the prior art to an unobvious extent, and that the results
are of a significant, practical advantage.").
103In reHarris, 409 F.3d at 1344.
104 MPEIP § 716.02(a)(1l).
105 In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 538 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
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expressing subjective approval of the claimed invention. 0 6 For example, In re
Skoner involved an application that claimed a method for putting zinc coatings
on iron substrates in a vacuum. 10 7 The method claimed use of wire brushing to
make abrasions on the iron substrate to better allow the zinc to adhere to the
iron. 0 8 The Court of Custom and Patent Appeals found that wire brushing to
cause adhesion was known, and that its application here had an entirely
predictable result 10 9 Failing to state a hypothesis leaves the applicant vulnerable
to the USPTO's claim that the results of the experiment were merely expected
beneficial results. 110
When attempting to illustrate unexpected results, the experiment itself needs
to be controlled for all variables except one.11' The single uncontrolled variable
is the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art." 2 The
application at issue in In re Dunn, for example, dealt with using inert N-alkyl
113
pyrrolidone as the solvent medium in an acrylic acid ester synthesis.
Although Dunn's experimentation resulted in better synthesis when compared
with other solvent mediums, it was unclear whether the results were attributable
to the inert N-alkyl pyrrolidone or something else. 114 That lack of clarity
resulted in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals denying Dunn's patent
5
entirely."1
An experiment used to successfully show unexpected results also needs to
be commensurate in scope with the protection sought by the claims. 116 The
PTAB has defined "commensurate in scope" to mean that the evidence in the
Rule 132 declaration "provides a reasonable basis for concluding that the
untested embodiments encompassed by the claims would behave in the same
manner as the tested embodiments." '1 7 Simply, the tests for the claimed

106 Exparte Uchida, No. 2011-0486, at 10 (B.P.A.I. July 7, 2011), available athttp://e-foiauspto.
gov/Foia/RetievePdf?system=BPAI&flNm=fd2011000486-07-07-2011-1 (citing In re Soni, 54
F.3d 746, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
107 In re Skoner, 517 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
108

Id.

109 Id

at 950.

110 Id. at 950-51.
111 See In re Dunn, 349 F.2d 433, 439 (C.C.PA. 1965) (holding that appellants' experimentation

failed to support a sufficient rebuttal for non-obviousness by unexpected results since
"comparative examples" must be "truly comparative," and "[t]he cause and effect sought to be
proven is lost.., in the welter of unfixed variables').
112 Id
113
114

Id at 435.
Id. at 439.

115 Id
116
117

In reBurckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1177 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Exparte Goto, No. 2012-5767, 2014 Pat App. LEXIS 6702, at *7-
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invention can only include the features claimed." 8 If a range such as "elevated
temperatures" is claimed, the tests need to cover all elevated temperatures.' 1 9
Where a patent's claims call for combinations or ranges, a representative sample
must be tested, not just one combination or value.' 20 However, applicants are
2
not required to test every embodiment within the scope of their claims.' '
Rather, where a series of tests indicate other embodiments falling within the
claim will behave in the same manner as those tested, those tests performed are
sufficient.'2
While an experiment needs to compare the claimed invention to the closest
prior art, there is no one way to determine what the closest prior art is.123 If the
examiner cites a primary reference in a rejection, then that reference is deemed
the closest prior art. 124 However, if the applicant asserts that a single reference
12
is the closest prior art then the examiner has the burden to prove otherwise. 5
Regardless, the closest prior art is generally either a single reference, or two
references applied independently, but not some combination of references
26
which forces the applicant to test the claimed invention against itself.
Once the experiment is complete, the results must be compared to both the
hypothesis and the closest prior art' 127 There are many published cases that fail
to state a hypothesis, causing a flawed declaration that fails to demonstrate nonobviousness. 128 Unsurprisingly, of those cases with a declaration stating a
hypothesis, none predicted that the claimed invention would perform worse
than the closest prior art. 29 However, merely exceeding the hypothesis and the
prior art is insufficient. 130 Rather, the declaration must state that the results

Id. at *8.
119In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1035-36 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
120 In re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506, 508 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
121 In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
122 In re Cescon, 474 F.2d 1331, 1334 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
123 See MPEP § 706.02(1) (instructing examiners on choosing prior art).
124 In re Baxter Travenol Labs, 952 F.2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
125 ExparteHein, No. 2013-4475, 2014 Pat App. LEXIS 1786, at *15-16 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 27, 2014).
118

126 Id. at*15.
127 Harris A.

Pitlick, Some Thougbts About Unexpected Results Jurijprudence, 86 J. PAT. &

TRADEMARK OFF.

SOC'Y 169, 169-70 (2004).

See id at 175 (discussing In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997), where the Board held
"that Geisler failed to rebut the primafacie case of obviousness" based in large part on his failure
to describe the test results contained in his specification as unexpected).
129 See id. at 171-72 (discussing the decision in In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 748-49 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
where the Federal Circuit overturned the Board and examiners rejection of the patent based
significantly in part on the language in the specification, stating "that the claimed compositions
have significantly improved physical and electrical properties..." as well as the inclusion of
comparative experimentation).
130 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
128
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were unexpectedly better than the declarant projected in the hypothesis.' 3'
Anything short of that incantation, even an attorney's assertion that the
132
declarant meant "unexpected," is insufficien
Even if the results of an applicant's test are different and better than
anticipated, this only informs patentability as the results are "different in kind
and not merely in degree from the results of the prior art. 1 33 This inquiry
looks to whether a skilled artisan would be able to make the modification that
brings the prior art to the level of the claimed invention. 134 The analysis,
proceeds in one of two ways.
First, tinkering with a variable known to affect the outcome of some
experiment is not usually considered inventive. 135 This includes changing
relative percentages of a composition of matter or changing the heat or pressure
inmaking that composition of matter.136 Such minor changes are regarded to
be within the skill of one in the art. 37 The exception to this is changing a
variable that a skilled artisan would not expect to have an impact on the
outcome. 138 That optimization would be patentable if the outcome of the
claimed invention was significantly different than tinkering with the "resulteffective variables" that one would expect to change the outcome of
139
experiments.
Second, applying obvious principles of science creates results of type, not
kind.140 Here, courts have dealt with issues like harder materials being more
4
resistant to wear and the color black providing more heat transfer.' ' If
prevailing scientific knowledge would indicate an invention would not work as
well as the prior art, then that invention exceeding the prior art would be an
unexpected result. 142
As a practical matter, the patent examiner here usually issues a notice of
allowance. However, out of fifty-nine cases that have approached the issue in
the past five years, the PTAB has had only one case that was resolved in favor
In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id.; In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
133Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In
reHuang, 100 F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
134In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
135 In reBudde, 319 F.2d 242, 245 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
136 Id at 246.
137 In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
138In r Dreyfus, 73 F.2d 931, 934 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
139 In reApplied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
140Exparte Schulz, No. 2009-1223, 2009 Pat. App. LEXIS 6506, at *17-18 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 31,
2009).
141 Id (finding that "a person of ordinary skill in the art would expect that a harder material
would be more wear resistant than a softer material").
142 Id. at *19.
131
132
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of the applicant when the applicant demonstrated that the prevailing science
was contradicted. 143
That case, Ex parte Epstein, dealt with a method for treating cancer that
involved administering a cancer-targeting molecule linked to a liver-expressed
chemokine (LEC) to a patient.144 The molecule attacked the tumor and the
LEC inhibited the tumor's ability to grow. 45 The method also involved
reducing the activity of T-cells in the body to prevent those cells from
interfering with the molecule. 146 The PTAB noted that the last step was
peculiar in that the patent examiner was unable to find any reference to show
that preventing T-cell activity would reduce tumor size. 147 Typically, T-cells
naturally fight cancer, so disabling them would seem counterintuitive. The
PTAB found Epstein's claims patentable.' 48 This demonstrates that unexpected
results contrary to prevailing scientific thought demonstrate non-obviousness.
VI. USING SIGNAL THEORY TO DEMONSTRATE NON-OBVIOUSNESS
When Shapiro is considered in view of the post-KSR legal landscape the
manifesting problem is the issuance of patents on obvious inventions that are
substitutes for one another. 149 The industrial organization of those patent
holders is to form patent pools that are able to charge monopolistic prices. 15°
At the same time, it is important that those who are producing complementary
inventions be able to receive patents to have a better effect at maximizing
consumer and social welfare.15' This can be accomplished with signal theory.
Signal theory has its origins in the work of Michael Spence. 152 Signal theory
explores the situation where there is a principal determining whether to grant a
benefit to the agent. 5 3 The principal will only grant the benefit if the principal
will get more from the agent than the agent receives. 154 The principal selects an
agent for the benefit on the basis of a signal. 55 A valid signal will distinguish a

143 Exparte Epstein, No. 2011-6369, 2013 Pat. App. LEXIS 891, at *14 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 1, 2013).
144

Id. at *1.

145 Id

146 Id. at *2.
147
148
149

150

Id at *11.
Id. at *14.
Shapiro, supra note 30, at 120.

FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, Exec.

Summary, at 6.

151 Shapiro, supra note 30, at 123.
152 See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaing 87 Q.J. EcoN. 355 (1973).
153 Id at 356.
154 Id at 356-57.
155 Id at 357.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2016

15

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

J. INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 23:241

productive agent from an unproductive agent 156
Spence argued that
credentialed education was a valid signal because unproductive agents would
not undergo the effort to obtain the signal. 5 7 Agents with more education were
valued more as productive or were seen as potentially more productive when
compared to others with less education. 158 Therefore, signal theory works best
with asymmetric information such as asymmetric level of education. l5 9
Similarly, the act of patenting can create a valid signal if costs of demonstrating
unexpected results are unreasonably high for substitute inventions and
reasonably low for complementary inventions.
A. SIGNAL COST AND BENEFIT
With regard to patents, the only signal that can distinguish one substitute
from another is how well the substitute works. The only way to gauge that is by
requiring test results to prove that the substitute is a substantially better solution
than what existed in the field at the time the patent application was filed.
However, before applying unexpected results to the tests, the testing system
requires some modification.
Some modification is needed because the American patent framework for
discerning unexpected results is ineffective. First, the entirety of the subjective
element is useless. The likelihood of an informed applicant producing a
declaration which did not state "the results were unexpected" or would perform
worse than the prior art is minimal. Second, the "control variable" requirement
is misleading. The control variable could affect some other part of the claimed
invention, which is responsible for the enhanced performance. Finally, there
would be inherent testing bias as testers would be compensated by the applicant
to agree with the applicant This creates a problem that previously existed in
having expert testimony in federal court prior to 2000.
There are two kinds of witness testimony in federal court: lay witness
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 701, and expert testimony
under FRE 702.160 Lay witness testimony can be provided by anyone who
perceived an event relevant to the matter at trial.161 Expert testimony is much
more restrictive and requires "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,

156

Id at 358 (assuming a negative correlation between signaling costs and productivity).

157 Id.at 361-62.
158

Id at 362.

159Id.at 364 (noting, "[w]e have an information problem in the society and the problem of
allocating the right people to the right jobs. Education, in its capacity as a signal in the model, is
helping us to do this properly.").
160 FED. R. EvID. 701, 702.
161 Id.
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skill, experience, training, or education" and whose testimony is generally
162
limited to a relevant opinion that will assist the trier of fact in a case.
However, not just any opinion can be proffered. Expert opinion testimony
requires "sufficient facts or data" obtained by "reliable principles and methods"
where the witness has reliably applied the principals and methods to the data to
163
reach the opinion.
The current witness requirements at the USPTO confuse the requirements
of ordinary observers (lay witnesses) and skilled observers (expert witnesses).
Lay witness testimony can be provided by anyone about anything and, by its
nature, has a strong subjective component. 64 A lay witness can say something
is big, small, strong, or weak and needs no justification. 165 An expert must use
reliable methods. 66 The expert, the methods, and the data must be presented
167
to the judge and approved before they can be submitted to the trier of fact'
The confusion between lay and expert "opinion" in Rule 132 practice
undermines the value of the data obtained. Europe has developed a framework
16 8
that resolves most of these issues, and could be applied to the United States.
In Europe, the inventive step test, as assessed by the "problem-and-solution
approach," governs a non-obviousness inquiry.169
The test requires a
"technically skilled assessment" of the claimed invention with the closest prior
art and information that is within the common general knowledge of one skilled
in the art 170 In Europe, the test must be more rigorous than in the United
States. Europe requires that the measurably better result be "convincingly
shown to have its origin in the distinguishing feature of the invention. ' 171 This
resolves all of the issues present in the American patent system except the
inherent bias in the declarant.
To remove bias and reform the American framework for determining
unexpected results, this Article proposes a form of arbitration to resolve issues
of patentability. Arbitration would be optional and the applicant would incur
the additional cost. The arbitration panel would complete a test to determine if
unexpected results are present and then make an opinion as to patentability.

162 FED. R_ EVID. 702(a).
163 FED. R. EVID. 702(b)-(c).
164 FED. R. EVID. 701.
165

Id.

R. EviD. 702(c).
FFD. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
168 EUR. PAT. OFF. GUIDELINFS FOR EXAMINATION, at pt. G, ch. VII (Nov. 2014).
166 FED.
167

169

Id.

Nippon Tel. & Tel. Corp., Tech. Bd. App. 0971/00, at 9 (i-ur. Pat. Off. May 7, 2003).
DSM IP Assets B.V. v. AMI Agrolinz Melamine Int'l GmbH, Tech. Bd. App. 1237/08, at 10
(Eur. Pat Off. July 26, 2010).
170

171
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A patent application would be eligible for patent arbitration if the only issue
remaining for patentability was obviousness. Therefore, the claimed invention
is patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, is not anticipated by a single prior art
reference under 35 U.S.C. 5 102, and the underlying application clearly
explained how to make and use the claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112. If
any of these elements were disputed, then the recourse would be an appeal to
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
At this point, a classic adverse selection problem exists. Adverse selection
exists when undesirable results occur as a result of asymmetric information. 172
This causes a sequential turn game where the applicant and the arbitration panel
take turns either providing or interpreting test results. Each side makes a
decision based both on its own imperfect data supplemented with opinion
about the other side. The applicant has to choose from the possible
combinations of testing types and number of trials (or subgames) based on its
opinion of how the arbitration panel would respond. Where a subgame is
selected based on such circumstance, the players seek a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. 173 This assumes that sellers (in this case, inventors) knew their
products better than buyers (here, the arbitration panel). 74 The panel would
either need a process or signal for screening out the valid patents from invalid
ones.
This Article proposes that a two-turn game could be played as follows.
There are two players: the applicant and the arbitration panel. Those players
operate in a state of nature where the arbitration panel proposes at least two
tests to be used to compare the invention with at least one of the closest prior
art references. The tests and prior art references can be joined to form a series
of tests and references having different costs associated with increasingly
elaborate experiments. The applicant can choose one combination. While any
combination could indicate patentability, more tests on more inventions
increase the chance that the arbitration panel could be convinced. The
arbitration panel would not know whether it is dealing with a substitute or a
complement, but it would know the amount of testing data it has before it.
More data indicates a greater likelihood of certainty that the performance of the
product is non-obvious. The cost in building discrete systems is high and the
cost of building complementary components is comparatively low. Thus, the
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium will be to patent complements instead of
substitutes.

172

George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons": Quak'y Uncertainy and the Market Mechanism, 84

Q.J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970).
173

jAN TIROLE, THEnThFORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 445 (1988).
Akerlof, supra note 172, at 489.

174
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The arbitration panel would not need to be comprised of Administrative
Patent Judges. Rather, it could be made up of technically qualified experts, say
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Technically qualified experts from NIST combined with other experts to
create a problem of competing experts at the ex parte stage was addressed in
Newman v.Quigg.175 Newman claimed to have invented a machine that produced
more energy than it receivect' 7 6 The Second Law of Thermodynamics says that
this is impossible. 177 As a result, the USPTO, via its commissioner Quigg,
rejected the application as claiming to do something that was impossible. 7 8 At
trial, the judge ordered a special master to review Newman's invention. 7 9 The
master concluded that the invention, in fact, produced more energy than it
used. 80 Quigg hired his own expert from NIST, who determined that the
invention did not produce more energy than it used. 181 Newman blamed this
result on the invention not being properly configured; nonetheless, the trial
judge found in favor of Quigg, and Newman appealed to the Court of Appeals
182
for the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit affimned, stating that Newman was present at the NIST
experiment and could have reconfigured his machine if desired. 183 Perhaps,
rather than disparaging the NIST experiment, Newman would have done better
to explain it. In Halpern's words, "physicists sometimes don't know the proper
arena within which certain laws apply."' 184 However, this would have required
another layer of expert testimony to interpret the results of the two
experiments. At that stage, the expense for Newman, having already paid for
lengthy federal court litigation, was simply too much. Instead of using
expensive expert opinion, he relied on his own inexpensive lay assessment of
the circumstances. This shows the strength of the signal involved.
Seemingly, the signal-that the Second Law of Thermodynamics did not
apply here in the way that Quigg believed-was possible, though extremely
expensive to obtain. Newman chose not to obtain the signal, and the U.S.
District Court chose not to order Quigg to issue a patent. Both of these
decisions were perfectly rational cost-benefit analyses.
175 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
176

Id at 1577.

177 PAUL HALPERN, WHAT'S SCIENCE EVER DONE FOR US?: WHAT TiIE SIMPSONS CAN TEACH

Us ABOUT PifySICS, ROBOTS, LIFE, AND THE UNIVERSE 81 (2007).
178

Newman, 877 F.2d at 1577.

179 Id.
180 Id

181Id at 1578.
182 Id at 1579-80.
183 Id at 1581.
184 HALPERN, sztranote

177, at 81.
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The rules for a patent arbitration panel would not make it impossible for a
substitute invention to be patented. Rather these rules simply need to make it
so expensive that the effort is not worth its cost. The patent arbitration panel
would make a threshold determination as to whether there was a gap between
the closest prior art and the claimed invention. The panel would then
determine what test would be best for discerning whether that gap was
sufficient to demonstrate non-obviousness. The examiner and applicant could
proffer tests as well. The test chosen would need to be relevant for the
particular field involved. For instance, ASTM International has created
thousands of tests to evaluate a variety of products which could be used in
particular subsets of cases to ensure that substitutes could not be easily
185
patented.
The test results should be validated using signal theory. A claimed invention
that improves upon prior art should be easily patentable because the cost of
testing an existing system should be minimal, and the benefit is readily
quantifiable. This complement, if patented, would likely cause an increase in
consumer surplus and benefit to society. The test result must be substantially
better than the hypothesis for any invention to be patented. This is because
patenting substitutes tend to lead to dangerous patent pools that cause prices to
1 6
go up, quantities to go down, and consumer surplus to decrease.
Once the panel decides on a test, the panel would create a hypothesis, and
then it would perform the test or hire someone else to do so at the expense of
the applicant Once the test has been completed, the panel would determine
whether the test results exceeded the hypothesis. If so, the invention would be
patentable. At this point, the invention could only be found not patentable in
litigation if this result was one of clear error. This is a higher standard of review
than "clear and convincing evidence," which is currently required to invalidate a
187
patent

185

See general# Detailed Over'iew, ASTM

INTERNATIONAL,

http://www.astm.org/ABOUT/full

_overview.html Oast visited Mar. 29, 2006) (describing the formation and use of ASTM
standards).
186 See Patent Pools and Antitrust-A Comparative Analysis, WORLD INTELLECYUAL PROP. ORG.
(Mar. 2014), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_
reportpdf.
187 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 1, ch. 5, at 26.
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VII. CONCLUSION

Patents that are granted and obvious in light of prior art are questionable
patents that create a drag on the economy. 188 One way to increase economic
competitive advantage within and between nations is to decrease the number of
invalid patents. 189 Demonstrating non-obviousness by unexpected results is
presently problematic in the United States because test results from the inventor
may be unreliable. The inventor also has a motivation to bias the results.
However, for those applications that claim an invention that is demonstrably
better than the prior art by independent testing, a higher standard of review
should apply in litigation. The solution is to create an arbitration panel to test
the invention and determine whether those test results merit a patent issuing.

188 Lcmley et al., supra note 65, at 12 ("Some bad patents, however, are more pernicious. They
award legal rights that are for broader that what their relevant inventions actually invented and
they do so with respect to technologies that turn out to be economically significant.").
189Hubbard, sapra note 55, at 1948.
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